COMBATING TERRORISM AND ITS EFFECT ON THE HORN OF AFRICA
Terrorism:
The word terrorism comes from the Reign of Terror
instigated by Mammalian Robespierre in 1793, following the French
revolution.Robespierre, one of twelve heads of the new state, had enemies of
the revolution killed, and installed a dictatorship to stabilize the country.
He justified his methods as a necessary in the transformation of the monarchy
to a liberal democracy:
He said that, “Subdue by terror the enemies of liberty,
and you will be right, as founders of the Republic”
His sentiment laid the foundations for modern terrorists,
who believe violence will usher in a better system. Terrorism has been defined
by different people as indicated below:
“This is unlawful
use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government or its citizens to further certain political or social objectives.”
(Source:
FBI)
“Criminal act, including against civilians,
committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury or taking of
hostages with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or
in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a
government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any
act.”
(Source:
UN Security Council Resolution 1566, 2004)
From the two definitions above, it can be concluded
that terrorism is a criminal act which includes killing, causing bodily harm
and also taking of hostages in an attempt to intimidate or coerce the government,
a group of persons or a population to further certain social or political
objectives.
Terrorism has been elevated to the foremost threat
to global security. The bombing of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
in Aug 1998 and the attack on the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa in
November 2002 confirmed that Kenya and indeed the horn of Africa as the
continent’s most insecure region and a soft target for terrorism. Vulnerability
to terrorism has thrus the region into the international spotlight as one of
the main theatres of the global anti-terrorist campaign. But like a
double-edged sword, the US’s war on terror following 11th September
2001 is at once stemming the spread of terrorism and accentuating insecurity in
the region’s volatile countries like
Comoros,Djibouti,Eritrea,Ethiopia,Kenya,Somalia (including the self-declared
Republic of Somaliland),Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.
Insecurity in the horn of Africa has deep roots in
the political use of terror by state and non-state actors. Examples of such
terror groups are liberation movements, guerillas, bandits, criminal gangs,
cattle rustlers, pirates, vigilantes as well as state terror, have been
included in the nomenclature of terrorism. But the spread of Islamic radicalism
in the 1990s gave terrorism an indelibly Muslim face in the Horn of Africa. As
observed by Alex de Waal, Islamism
has transformed this horn of Africa into a veritable arena of conflict between
jihadists and their enemies, evoking the Huntingtonian clash of civilizations between
the West and the Rest in the reordering of global security and power relations.
A medley of endemic poverty, chronic underdevelopment and a deep sense of marginalization, in the light
of the negative forces of economic globalization, proximity to and historical
linkages with the middle east have transformed the region into an incubator of radical Islamists ideas and
local cells of international terrorist networks.
Efforts of counter-terrorism which have been employed
has had a mixed impact on the security
situation in the Horn of Africa .Broadly, efforts against terrorism opened a
new security frontiers, engendering a re-ordering of priorities and fundamental
rethinking about security in the Horn of
Africa. The dynamics of the war on terrorism catalyzed peace deal in Somalia
and Sudan, but also fostered restrictive security paradigms which have
perpetuated conflicts and stoked civil wars in the region. The campaign against
terrorism also gave new impetus to old security perspectives that privileged
state stability, enabling regimes to instrumentally utilize terrorism for
political ends. On their part, local extremist groups, redefined as ‘terrorists’,
formed strategic alliances with Islamists aimed at securing aid and sanctuary
and imported into the local theatres of war tactics of Jihadists such as beheading
victims.
Response to terrorism by African governments threatened
the ability of fragile states like Sudan, Somalia, Chad, Congo and Central
African Republic with hastily introduced counter-terrorist laws that threatened
human rights and widened religious fissures. Disaffection with the US’s blanket
definition of terrorism within African has resulted in poor coordination
between regional and international counter-terrorist initiatives, making
counter-terrorism one of the weakest links of Africa’s peace and security
agenda which has emerged in the aegis of the African Union (AU) from 2002.
In line with the increased focus on Africa in the US
security strategy, the Horn was redefined as a particularly risky region that
became a focus of Washington’s counter-efforts against terrorism, including the
East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) and the Combined Joint Task
Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).However, Washington’s high-handed approach to
counter-terrorism has imperiled fragile democracies in countries like Kenya.
Its recent policy lapses in backing warlords as a counter-terrorist strategy in
Somalia have also escalated insecurity and heightened the risk of a full-scale
war and further terrorist attacks against the neighboring countries.
Terrorists’
Soft Target
Where the al Qaeda of Osama bin Laden’s leadership
flew an airplane into the Pentagon in a meticulously prepared operation, the
tip of today’s global jihad spear is increasingly pointed at exploiting such
“soft targets” as shopping malls like West-Gate, sporting events, tourist attractions,
public service vehicles like in the case of a bus heading to Nairobi from
Mandera where a good number of
government staff were shot and killed, learning institutions like in the case
of Garissa University college where not less than 150 students were shot and
killed by the terrorists.
Islamism
and Insecurity
There are a number of reasons why the Horn of Africa
has become a battleground for Jihadists and their foes as stated below:
First, the regions geographical proximity and bonds
of history with Middle East facilitated the movements of terrorist agents
within and across the two regions.
Secondly, Corruption among the security personnel
deployed to man the borders. They obtain bribe from the terrorists and in
return facilitate their movements from the border points to their areas of
interest.
Thirdly, countries in the region are either predominantly
Muslim or have significant Muslim minorities as analyzed below:
v Comoros
(98 per cent Muslim)
v Djibouti
(94 per cent Muslim)
v Eritrea
(50 per cent Muslim)
v Ethiopia
(50 per cent Muslim)
v Kenya
(10 per cent Muslim)
v Somalia
–including the self-declared Republic of Somaliland (100 per cent Muslim)
v Sudan
(35 per cent Muslim)
v Tanzania
(35 per cent Muslim)
v Uganda
(16 per cent Muslim)
This exposed them to sectarian conflicts and
international terrorism.
Forth, paradoxically, the expansion of democratic
space from the 1990s emboldened activism inspired by radical Islamic ideas
among disaffected Muslim minorities, particularly at the coast-forlornly
described by the Kenyan scholar Ali
Mazrui as a region trapped between globalization and marginalization.
Fifth and the last one, a mix of widespread poverty,
chronic under-development and a deep sense of marginalization, accentuated by
the negative forces of economic globalization, enabled Islamists to export
their ideas and to win allies among impoverished Muslim minorities and
desperate refugees.
Islamism
in East Africa
The spread of Islamism at the East African coast in
the 1990s witnessed the rising terrorist violence. In Kenya, the government
refused to register the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) formed by a fiery Muslim cleric,
Sheikh Khalid Balala, to articulate
the grievances of Muslim minorities.IPK youths killed three police officers in
protests in Mombasa. On 13th August 1997,500 Islam youths raided and
razed the Likoni police station in Mombasa to the ground, killing six police
officers and making a way with 30-50 guns and 3,00-5,000 rounds of ammunition.
Some 100 non-Muslims were also killed and 100,000 others displaced in Mombasa
and its environs. In May 2003, the government announced that a key al-Qaeda
member was plotting an attack on Western interests, confirming the presence of
international terrorist in the country together with other allies.
Tanzania also experienced a surge of Islamism
organized around the Baraza kuu za Waislam wa Tanzania
(National Association of Koran Readers in Tanzania,or Balukta),which was
created in the 1980s to advance the course of Islamic militancy.Balukta forged
clandestine ties with Iran and Sudan,which the government accused of giving
military training to its nationals to topple the government and for fuelling
riots in April 1993.Militants were not only behnd violent takeovers of moderate
mosques in Dares Salamm and the firebombing of a tourist bar in Stone Town in
2002,but were also responsible for the violence that marred elections in
Zanzibar in 200 and in October 2005.One of the pillars of Islamic Militancy is
cleric Sheik Ponda Isi Ponda,who
founded the group Simba wa Mungu (God’s Lion),an underground sect accused of
orchestrating attacks on foreigners and moderate Tanzanian Muslims.Al-Qaeda
operatives such as Khalfan Khamis Muhammad,
one of those convicted in connection with the 1998 US embassy bombing here in
Nairobi,Kenya and Qaed Sanyan al-Harithi,another al-Qaeda agent killed in Yemen in 2004,were
linked to Sheik Ponda.
How
can Terrorism be combated?
The first priority of any sober government is to
protect its country and the security of its citizens not only at home but also abroad.
In the recent past, there has been numerous attacks in the Horn of Africa
particularly Kenya for its deployment of military personnel in Somalia in year
2011. Examples of such kind of attacks in Kenyan soil following the deployment
of Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in Somalia are:
v The
very first attack by al-Shabaab was on a blue-collar bar known as Maura’s in
downtown Mfangano Street in Nairobi on Monday, 24th October 2011 at around
1:15am.The hurled grenade left one person dead and wounded more than 20 people.
v A
second blast occurred later the same day, when a grenade was tossed out of a
moving vehicle into the Machakos bust terminus where five people were confirmed
dead while several were seriously injured.
v On
Sunday, 29th April 2012, at around 8.50am, an attack took place at God’s House
of Miracle at Ngara Estate in Nairobi. One person died and 11 were admitted.
v On
21 September 2013, armed gunmen attacked the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi
killing at least 69 people and injuring more than 175.
v On
22nd November 2014, gunmen attacked a bus travelling from Mandera to
Nairobi, killing 28 persons, mostly teachers and government workers.
v On
2nd December 2014, Al-Shabaab militants attacked and killed a
further 36 quarry workers, many of whom were non-Muslims near Mandera Town.
v On
2nd April 2015, gunmen stormed the Carissa University College
killing at least 150 people (147 students) and injuring more than 79 others.
All these kinds of attacks and many more not mentioned
here could have been prevented if the government could have been proactive
enough and came up with strategies which could have been used to combat the
terrorism activities at the time of deploying the KDF to Somalia.
The only way any government around the world can
combat terrorism is by BUILDING
RESILIENCE AGAINST IT (TERRORISM). Resilience is both a principle and an
underlying theme of the strategy. It involves fostering a society in which
individuals and communities are able to withstand violent extremist ideologies
and challenge those who espouse them. They support and participate in efforts
that seek to protect the country’s Security Intelligence Service and other
agencies with security roles. It will show clearly the integrated approach to
dealing with these terrorists ‘threats both at home and abroad.
Building Resilience basically entails how the locals,
national and international support the government and the citizen at large in
combating terrorism. The aim of this Resilience strategy is to counter domestic
and international terrorism in order to protect citizen by:
v Help
to focus and galvanize country’s law enforcement and the security intelligence
community around a clear strategic objective.
v Provides
a common basis do discus country’s approach and guiding principles
v Assist
in shaping future counter-terrorism priorities
v Through
Periodicpreview, assists in regularly taking stock of the nature of the
terrorist threat and how the country is dealing with it.
This strategy operates through four mutually
reinforcing elements: Prevent ,Detect, Deny and Respond. All
governments’ activities worldwide are directed towards one or more of these
elements:
Prevent
Activities in this area focus on the motivation of
individuals who engage in, or have the potential to engage in terrorist
activities at home and abroad. The emphasis will be on addressing the factors that may motivate individuals to
engage in terrorist activities e.g. unemployment.
The purpose of this element is to prevent
individuals from engaging in terrorism activities and the desired outcomes are:
v Resilience
of communities to violent extremism and radicalization is bolstered.
v Violent
extremist ideology is effectively challenged by producing effective narratives
to counter it.
v The
risk of individuals succumbing to violent extremism and radicalization is
reduced.
Detect
This element focuses on identifying terrorists,
terrorist organizations and their supporters, their capabilities and the nature
of their plans. This can be done through investigation, intelligence operations
and analysis, which can also lead to criminal prosecutions. A strong intelligence capabilities and a solid understanding of
the changing threat environment are key. This involves extensive collaboration
and information sharing with domestic and international partners.
The purpose of this element is to detect the
activities of individuals and organizations who may pose a terrorist threat and
its desired outcome are:
v Terrorist
threats are identified in a timely fashion
v Robust
and comprehensive detection of terrorist activity and effective alerting system
are in place
v Information
is shared effectively, appropriately and proactively within the country, with
key allies and non-traditional partners.
Deny
A strong intelligence and law enforcement actions
can deny terrorists the means and opportunities to pursue terrorist activities.
This involvolves mitigating vulnerabilities and aggressively intervening in
terrorist planning, including prosecuting individuals involved in terrorist
related criminal activities, denying them access to chemical,biological,Radiological,Nuclear
and Explosives (CBRNE) weapons, denying them access at the border, listing
indivividuals and organizations believed to be linked to terror group under the
criminal
code or the United Nations al
Qaida and Taliban Regulation (UNAQTR) and the Regulations Implementing the
United Nations Resolutions on the Suppression of Terrorism (RIUNRST)and making
the country’s interest a more difficult target for would-be-terrorists.
The purpose of this element is to deny terrorists
the mean and opportunity to carry out their activities in order to protect the
country and its citizen’s interest.
Its desired outcomes are:
v A
strong ability to counter terrorist activities at home and abroad is maintained
v Prosecutions
are pursued and concluded effectively.
v The
means and opportunity to support terrorist activities are denied
v A
strong cooperation with key allies and non-traditional partners is maintained
Respond
Terrorist attacks can and do occur. Developing a
country’s capacities to respond proportionately, rapidly and in an organized
manner to terrorist activities and to mitigate their effects is another aspect
of the strategy. This element also speaks to the importance of ensuring a rapid
return to ordinary life and reducing the impact and severity of terrorist
activities.
The purpose of this element is to respond
proportionately, rapidly and in an organized manner to terrorist activities and
to mitigate their effects.
Their desired outcomes are:
v Capabilities
to address arrange of terrorist incidents are in place.
v Rapid
Response and recovery capability of critical infrastructure is maintained.
v Continuity
of government and basic social institutions is ensured.
v Government
leadership through effective public messaging is demonstrated.
If the Horn of African governments can apply all the
above stated elements of resilience in a bid to combat terrorism, these
barbaric acts of terrorists will be brought under control and their actions and
plans will definitely “die a slow death.”
Conclusion
The fight against terrorism is not a job which can
be undertaken by one single agency. It requires team work and input from a
wider range of national and international organizations including law
enforcement agencies, the military, the intelligence services, the financial sector,
the diplomatic service and health organizations. The key to success is Organization,
cooperation and coordination among all the stakeholders involved both locals,
national and international.
While African governments have joined the US-led
‘war on terror,’ its institutions particularly the AU, IGAD and the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), must unwaveringly pursue a
counter-terrorism campaign within and its broader framework of the emerging
continental peace and security agenda. They should work with international
partners to boost regional abilities to deal effectively with the security
threats posed by terrorism, always ensuring greater coordination between African
efforts and those of international players like the US.Otherwise, the
parameters of the war on terror will continue to be set by imperatives of the
global insecurity with little attention to local security realities. Maxim Worcester ones stated that a pre-requisite
for success in combating terrorism is good governance. This is effective to the
administration of a state’s resources, the rule of law and the development of a
strong civil society. If and only if such kinds of structures are put in place
can the war on terror, which is fuelled by dissatisfaction and ignorance, be
won.
References
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14.FBI
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